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‘Direct Democracy in the United Kingdom: Reflections from the Scottish Independence 
Referendum’ 
Stephen Tierney 
I. Introduction 
On 18 September 2014 55% of Scots voted no to the proposition: ‘Should Scotland be an 
Independent Country?’. It was inevitable that during the campaign attention should be 
focused upon the likely outcome of the vote, major substantive issues of contention such as 
currency relations between an independent Scotland and the United Kingdom, and the ease or 
difficulty with which an independent Scotland would achieve membership of the European 
Union. In this article, however, I will assess the referendum process itself, seeking both to 
determine its democratic merits and to draw out lessons for future referendum design, 
particularly in the United Kingdom which already has an elaborate regulatory statute in the 
shape of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA). 
 
Referendums have a bad name within political and constitutional theory. They are widely 
considered to be easily manipulated by political elites and incapable of fostering the 
meaningful deliberation of citizens. Rather than an asset to democratic decision-making, 
referendums are often perceived to be a threat to a healthy constitutional system.1 I have 
argued elsewhere that the democratic deficiencies associated with referendums are principally 
issues of practice rather than principle and that a properly regulated referendum should be 
capable of overcoming these problems.2 In particular, the recent turn in political theory and 
democratic practice towards deliberative democracy can assist in helping to build, through 
detailed legal regulation, a referendum that is capable of performing the task of engaging 
citizens in a meaningful act of republican deliberation.3 In this article I will use the Scottish 
independence referendum to test this hypothesis.  
 
My central proposition is that the conditions surrounding the referendum in Scotland offered 
an ideal case study with which to assess how regulation can foster the deliberative 
engagement of citizens. First, it was organised within a healthy and fully-functioning 
democracy. Secondly, it was long in the planning: the Scottish Government announced its 
intention to hold a referendum in January 2012,4 some two and a half years before the vote 
itself, thus offering a lengthy span of time within which channels of deliberative participation 
                                                          
 Stephen Tierney is Professor of Constitutional Theory in the School of Law, University of Edinburgh and 
Director of the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law. From 2012-14 he held an ESRC Senior Research 
Fellowship to study the referendum process. He served as independent adviser to the Scottish Government on 
the technical aspects of the referendum for six months in 2012, and in January 2013 was appointed 
constitutional adviser to the Scottish Parliament’s Referendum (Scotland) Bill Committee. 
1 John Haskell, Direct Democracy or Representative Government? Dispelling the Populist Myth (Westview 
Press 2001). 
2 S. Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012).  
3 Stephen Tierney 'Using Electoral Law to Construct a Deliberative Referendum: Moving Beyond the 
Democratic Paradox' (2013) Election Law Journal 1-17. 
4 Scottish Government, ‘Your Scotland – Your Referendum – A Consultation Document’, 25 January 2012 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/01/1006 
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might be fostered. Thirdly, the UK already had in place a model of referendum procedures 
which, inter alia, created an independent Electoral Commission and invested it with a 
detailed oversight role in UK referendums5; notably the existing UK legal regime was very 
influential in the framing of the Scottish referendum process. Fourthly, the referendum 
process was framed against, and given additional legal authority and political credibility by, 
the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’ between the UK and Scottish governments, the aim of which was 
to ensure the referendum delivered ‘a fair test and a decisive expression of the views of 
people in Scotland and a result that everyone will respect’.6 And finally, the referendum was 
regulated by two statutes passed by the Scottish Parliament - the Scottish Independence 
Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013 (‘the Scottish Franchise Act’), and the Scottish 
Independence Referendum Act 2013 (‘the Scottish Referendum Act’) - which together 
offered a comprehensive framework of rules and constraints.  
II. The Referendum Pathology 
Before turning to the deliberative qualities or deficiencies of the Scottish experience it is 
useful to explore further the perceived deficiencies of referendums in general. Referendums 
are paradoxical. From a positive perspective they seem to represent an ideal model of 
democracy. The voters speak as one unified people, deciding on an issue for themselves, 
rather than through the mediation of politicians. What could be more democratic? By this 
construction we see in the referendum the republican promise of democracy fulfilled; 
political equality is confirmed as citizens come together in a collective expression of popular 
sovereignty.7 But for others the referendum is a dangerous device because it in fact imperils 
democracy which can only be properly effected through exclusively representative 
institutions, and as a result the referendum is best excluded from processes of constitutional 
change. There are three main objections that inform the scepticism of this position: that 
referendums lend themselves by definition to elite control and hence manipulation by the 
organisers of the referendum (‘the elite control syndrome’); that there is an in-built tendency 
of the referendum process merely to aggregate pre-formed opinions rather than to fostering  
meaningful deliberation (‘the deliberation deficit’); and that referendums consolidate and 
even reify simple majoritarian decision-making at the expense of minority and individual 
interests (‘the majoritarian danger’).8 In this article I address the first two of these criticisms. 
Scotland is not a divided society with readily identifiable minorities whose interests are 
clearly imperilled by an exercise in majoritarian decision-making. Therefore, I will not try to 
draw wider lessons in relation to ‘the majoritarian danger’ from the Scottish referendum.  
The elite control syndrome is the most prominent charge levelled at referendums. A recurring 
complaint is that referendums promise popular power, including control by the people over 
elites, but are themselves so open to manipulation as to belie that promise. In other words, 
even if popular influence on constitutional processes is a republican good, referendums do 
                                                          
5 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, Part 1. 
6 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on 
independence for Scotland, 15 October 2012 available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence 
7 V. Bogdanor, The People and the Party System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 93.  
8 S Tierney, “Constitutional Referendums: A Theoretical Enquiry” (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 360; S. 
Tierney, Constitutional Referendums n.2 above. 
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not deliver that influence. Behind this objection lies the presupposition that an executive has 
the opportunity to shape the referendum process in order to achieve its objectives. Among the 
tools that are frequently assumed to be at the disposal of elites are: the initial decision to stage 
the referendum in the first place, the power unilaterally to frame the question, and the 
capacity to determine the process rules by which the referendum will be conducted, rules 
which can then be shaped to play to the government’s strengths, for example by manipulating 
funding and spending regulation. According to this critique, the government is virtually 
assured a successful outcome. As the Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart 
famously put it, ‘most referendums are both controlled and pro-hegemonic’.9  
The second objection, which is largely based upon the assumptions of the first, is that public 
reasoning is absent from referendum processes. Representative government is a far better 
model of decision-making because it is designed in a way that causes elected politicians to 
cooperate and, in doing so, to offer reasons for their views. By contrast, informed reflection 
upon, and discussion of, the issues at stake are not required in referendum processes, and are 
accordingly absent.  
What we find again undergirding this critique are a number of assumptions, themselves often 
founded upon stereotypes: referendums tend to be held quickly in response to a spontaneous 
political calculation made by government; voters are presented with an issue which they have 
not had time to learn about or debate; voter confusion can be exacerbated by a deliberately 
obscure question which in many cases pushes responses in a particular direction; and citizens 
with busy lives lack the time and the incentive to engage with the issue and even the ability to 
understand it. The result is that those who bother to vote do so in an uninformed way, without 
adequate reflection, deliberation or public discussion, largely following the cues set by the 
referendum’s organisers.  
I will test both of these objections, and the assumptions underpinning them, in the context of 
the Scottish process, seeking to draw out broader conclusions about the application of direct 
democracy within the UK constitutional system. 
III.  Problems of Practice not Principle?: Towards a Deliberative Referendum 
The issues which concern democratic theorists are certainly very real but they are concerns 
founded upon assumptions, the salience of which diminishes in the face of careful 
referendum design and adequate regulation. Consequently, the theory and practice of 
deliberative democracy, in which great strides have recently been taken in finding new ways 
in which to engage the popular participation of citizens in democratic decision-making, offers 
a vehicle with which to introduce good practice in referendums.  
Deliberative democracy is now a well-established school, the emergence of which is often 
traced back to John Rawls’ focus upon ‘public reason’.10 This field of scholarship has taken 
many directions and is now advocated by political theorists across the ideological spectrum.11 
                                                          
9 Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries 
(Yale University Press 1984), 203. See also Matt Qvortrup, ‘Are Referendums Controlled and Pro-hegemonic?’ 
(2000) 48 Political Studies 821. 
10 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993). 
11 John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations (Oxford University 
Press 2000).  
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A notable division of labour is between those who reflect upon a deliberative approach to 
politics through the abstraction of political theory12 and those who seek to deploy deliberation 
in practical experiments in democratic decision-making.13 It is the latter area of scholarship 
which offers practical lessons for referendum design and it is here in particular that we can 
draw out wider lessons of good practice from the Scottish experience.  
What is often missing from the political science, however, is the specific role law can play in 
supplying in a practical way the necessary regulation needed to facilitate deliberation. The 
effective regulation of the referendum process can work to diminish the elite control critique 
as I will explain below, but it is also the case that by implementing the principles of 
deliberative democracy within such a regulatory regime that avenues can be opened up to 
engage the public better, thereby overcoming the deliberation deficit. In other words, if 
regulation is itself based upon the deliberative principles of popular participation as a good 
and public reasoning as a realisable republican goal, then it is possible to develop electoral 
law and models of regulation in the construction of a ‘deliberative referendum’.14 Efforts 
should be focused upon mobilising levels of popular participation in terms of voter turnout, 
but also upon the quality of that participation. If a referendum is to overcome the elite control 
and deliberation deficit criticisms it must be shown that it offers a meaningful space for an 
exercise in collective public reason by citizens who understand an issue, engage with it, and 
are able to make an informed decision relatively free from elite-led influences and pressures. 
How then did the Scottish referendum measure up against these benchmarks? I will focus 
upon the three central elements of the Scottish process which, I argued above, go to the heart 
of the elite control syndrome and deliberation deficit: the initiation power, question-setting 
and process regulation, asking how well the Scottish model worked, and what broader lessons 
can be drawn for other regulatory regimes, particularly that of the United Kingdom, as they 
seek to limit elite control and encourage popular participation throughout the referendum 
process.  
i. The Initiation Power: Dispersing Elite Control 
In a sense any referendum is ‘elite-controlled’, as indeed is any electoral process, if this is 
taken to mean organised by the established institutions of the state. The central issue is how 
this power is allocated among institutions. The feature that tends to set alarm bells ringing is 
where the organisation power in a referendum rests exclusively in the hands of the executive 
without a meaningful role for the legislature or for any level of independent oversight. 
The first issue is the decision to set the referendum itself. Some countries, for example 
Australia and Ireland, offer constitutional regulation of the initiation power; a referendum is a 
                                                          
12 Emily Hauptmann, ‘Deliberation = Legitimacy = Democracy’ (1999) 27 Political Theory 857; Simone 
Chambers, ‘Deliberative Democratic Theory’ (2003) 6 Annual Review of Political Science 307.  
13 John Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy (OUP 
2006); Robert Goodin and John Dryzek, ‘Making Use of Mini-Publics’ in Goodin, Innovating Democracy: 
Democratic Theory and Practice after the Deliberative Turn (Oxford University Press 2008); Shawn Rosenberg 
(ed), Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (Palgrave Macmillan 2007); Janette 
Hartz-Karp and Michael K Briand, ‘Institutionalizing Deliberative Democracy’ (2009) 9 Journal of Public 
Affairs 125; James S Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (OUP 
2009). 
14 Tierney, Election Law Journal, n3 above. 
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legally required part of the constitutional amendment process. By contrast the UK leaves the 
initiation of referendums to the discretion of the central government as we seen in the 
referendums of 1975, 1979, 1997, 1998 and 2011 (Table 1).  
Referendums in the United Kingdom 
Place Date Issue Turnou
t 
Result 
Northern 
Ireland 
8 March 1973 Remain part of the UK  
 
58.7 Approved: 98.9 
Northern 
Ireland 
22 May 1998 Belfast Agreement 81.1 Approved: 71.1 
Scotland 1 March 1979 Creation of a Scottish 
Assembly  
33 
 
Approved: 52 
(did not meet 
threshold) 
Wales 1 March 1979 Creation of a Welsh 
Assembly 
58.8 Not approved: 
79.7 
Scotland 11 September 
1997 
1. Creation of a Scottish 
Parliament. 
2. Devolution of limited 
tax-varying powers 
60.4 1. Approved: 74.3 
2. Approved: 63.5 
Wales 18 September 
1997 
Creation of a National 
Assembly 
50.1 Approved: 50.3 
England 
(London) 
7 May 1998 GLA and Mayor  34.6 Approved: 72 
England 
(North East) 
4 November 
2004 
North East England 
regional assembly 
47.8 Not approved: 78 
Wales 3 March 2011 Devolution of further 
powers to the National 
Assembly 
35.4 Approved: 63.5 
Scotland 18 September 
2014 
Independence 84.7 Not approved: 
55.3 
United 
Kingdom 
5 June 1975 Continued EC 
membership 
64.5 Approved: 67.2 
United 
Kingdom 
5 May 2011 Electoral System: 
Alternative Vote 
42.2 Not approved: 
67.9 
Table 1 
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This has led to referendums being used for party political purposes. For example, in the early 
1970s the Labour Party feared that a damaging split could emerge over membership of the 
EEC and decided that a referendum would help avoid this by allowing a free vote for MPs 
including ministers. James Callaghan described the referendum as ‘lifeboat’ into which the 
party was climbing in order to see off the danger of fission.15 Labour returned to the 
referendum in similar circumstances in relation to devolution. Proposals put forward in 1976 
for assemblies for Scotland and Wales were widely opposed within the party. Vernon 
Bogdanor comments that the promise of a referendum which accompanied these proposals 
‘was a device that would enable Labour backbenchers opposed to devolution nevertheless to 
vote for it in the House of Commons while campaigning against it in the referendum.’16 The 
bill was in the end withdrawn in March 1977. But when it was revived in 1977-78 
referendums were again proposed and these were held in 1979. Again Bogdanor points to 
how the 1979 referendums were used ‘to defuse an issue.’17  
The AV referendum in 2011 was also instigated for party political reasons. The decision to 
hold a referendum on this issue was the result of a political deal by the two parties forming 
the coalition government in 2010. In a similar way we must also see the Conservative Party 
promise of a referendum on EU membership, planned to take place in the event of victory in 
the election of May 2015. This is again a political device, in this case to confront the UKIP 
threat and to shore up a potential split in the Conservative party; the latter motivation bearing 
clear parallels with the 1975 referendum.  
The initiation of the Scottish referendum was similar in being a policy proposal of the 
government of the day, stemming from an SNP manifesto commitment ahead of the 2011 
Scottish parliamentary election. However, beyond the initial policy initiative it became clear 
very quickly that the power actually to organise a referendum was shared between the UK 
and Scottish governments, thus dispersing this crucial area of control.  
To be sure of its lawful competence to organise the referendum through the Scottish 
Parliament, the Scottish Government concluded the Edinburgh Agreement18 with the UK 
Government. This gave the UK Government a handle also on the initiation power and hence 
some input into the referendum process and how it would be delivered. This had two clear 
advantages from the perspective of diluting elite control. First, the control of the referendum 
was subjected to public debate; secondly, the Scottish Government’s discretion in setting the 
question and important process rules such as funding and spending was tightly circumscribed, 
requiring each of the two governments to subject their preferences to the deliberative scrutiny 
of the other, as well as to public and media debate.  
                                                          
15 David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (Macmillan Press, 1976), p.282. 
16 Vernon Bogdanor The People and the Party System The Referendum and Electoral Reform in British Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.42. 
17 Ibid p.45. 
18 n.6 above. This, and the associated ‘memorandum of agreement’, provided that the referendum should have a 
clear legal base; be legislated for by the Scottish Parliament; and be conducted so as to command the confidence 
of parliaments, governments and people. This was formalised by an Order in Council (per Scotland Act 1998 
s30) which devolved to the Scottish Parliament the competence to legislate for a referendum on independence 
which had to be held before the end of 2014. Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2013, para 
3. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/242/made  
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In this respect the Scottish referendum bears healthy comparison with UK-wide referendums 
which are instigated solely by the central government, often for internal party purposes. But 
since the dispersal of power in the Scottish case was a direct consequence of the limited 
devolved powers of the Scottish government, it is hard to see any obvious lessons for the far 
more powerful UK government supported by a sovereign parliament. Should a future UK 
government seek to organise a referendum on EU membership it will not be subjected to the 
types of controls which faced the Scottish Government in the course of 2012-13. 
Given that this is the case, are there others ways in which the near complete discretion which 
the UK government enjoys in relation to referendums can be reined in? In the first place, it is 
the case that the UK government’s power hinges also on Parliament’s cooperation. 
Parliament has a role in legislating for each specific referendum, setting out specific process 
rules to supplement the general regulatory regime contained in PPERA. But as we see, 
certainly in relation to the referendum on the Alternative Vote system in 2011, this was in 
effect a rubber-stamping exercise with no real scrutiny of why the referendum was being 
held, whether it was a good idea or whether it was likely to stimulate public interest.19 It is 
clear from the turnout (42.2 per cent) and the result (68 per cent voted No and 32 per cent 
voted Yes) in 2011 that many people did not view the AV proposition as an important issue, 
something which should have been clear to parliamentarians; instead the majority of them 
accepted the referendum as a permissible outcome of the coalition deal. In a system of 
parliamentary government such a level of executive control is perhaps inevitable, but it does 
raise the question whether the UK needs more systematic legal regulation of the initiation 
power. 
Partly to address this level of executive discretion, in 2010 the House of Lords Constitution 
Committee conducted an inquiry into referendum use in the UK, and one of the targets for 
those giving evidence to the Committee were the circumstances surrounding the AV 
referendum.20 The Committee in its report recognised the lack of any over-arching legal or 
constitutional regime to regulate decisions on whether or not to hold a referendum, and on 
what issues. The Committee took the view that if referendums are to be a feature of UK 
political life they should only be held for specific purposes of the highest constitutional 
significance. It also went on to consider whether and if so how these purposes might be 
regulated by legislation. The Committee first sought to categorise those ‘fundamental 
constitutional issues’ in relation to which referendums might be appropriate, while also 
observing the considerable difficulties in defining such a term.21 Its non-exhaustive list 
included proposals: ‘To abolish the Monarchy; To leave the European Union; For any of the 
nations of the UK to secede from the Union; To abolish either House of Parliament; To 
change the electoral system for the House of Commons; To adopt a written constitution; and 
To change the UK’s system of currency.’22 In its conclusions the Committee remained 
sceptical of referendums (as a parliamentary body that is scarcely surprising), but it did 
recognise that the level of demand for referendums is growing and that the question of 
                                                          
19 Hence the very straightforward passage through Parliament afforded to the Bill which would become the 
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011. 
20 ‘Referendums in the United Kingdom’, House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report with 
Evidence, HL Paper 99, 2009-10, Minutes of Evidence. 
21 House of Lords Report Chapter 6 Conclusion, para 206. 
22 House of Lords Report Chapter 7 Summary of Recommendations, para 210. 
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defining which changes are so fundamental as to require a referendum does need to be 
addressed. However, in the end it concluded that each decision should in fact be left to 
Parliament on a case by case basis in recognition both of Westminster’s legislative 
supremacy and of the essentially political nature of the decision at stake. 
No legislation has followed from this report and we are left with the situation within which 
referendums remain largely a political tool at the hands of government. Having said that, with 
the wave of constitutional reform since 1997 we have also seen a gradual growth in piece by 
piece regulation of the initiation power, with the referendum enshrined in law as a 
prerequisite for certain forms of constitutional change, particularly in the devolution context. 
For example, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (s1) confirms that ‘Northern Ireland in its 
entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent 
of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland’ voting in a referendum. The reunification of 
Ireland is not possible under this statute without a referendum, although an  executive role 
remains since the initiation of the referendum is at the discretion of the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland. The Government of Wales Act 2006 also confirmed the need for a 
referendum on further devolution for Wales, a provision which resulted in the Welsh 
referendum in 2011,23 and the Wales Act 2014 also provides for a referendum on whether its 
income tax provisions ought to come into force.24 Another important initiative is the 
European Union Act 2011 which requires that a referendum be held on any significant 
amendments to the EU treaties.25  
Of course each of these provisions could be repealed by Parliament (indeed s18 of the 
European Union Act, which reiterates the principle of the sovereignty of Parliament, reminds 
us of this power). But as things stand, each of these provisions restricts executive discretion, 
and in political terms at least it would be very difficult for these provisions to be removed by 
Parliament.  
Such regulation, however, remains confined to a very few cases and the overall UK approach 
to referendum initiation remains ad hoc. But I would argue that this in itself is not necessarily 
problematic in democratic terms. Direct democracy does not stand alone, separate from 
representative democracy. In reality the two always co-exist, with the institutions of the latter 
providing the regulatory framework for the former. The fact that Parliament is laying down 
referendum requirements on a case by case basis, for very specific issues, suggests a certain 
responsiveness to the public demand for greater direct democracy. This development is in 
part the outcome of a broader debate, often involving civil society, about the process as well 
as the substance of constitutional change. This is certainly the case in relation to referendum 
requirements now embedded in the devolution statutes for Northern Ireland and Wales. And 
this approach, responding to specific public interest in particular issues, may well be a more 
appropriate and practically effective approach than a general statute which attempts to 
circumscribe every eventuality across the constitution that might require a referendum. 
We see this when we consider the alternative possibilities. I have noted that some states build 
the referendum into the standard constitutional amendment process, triggering direct 
democracy automatically in the event of certain constitutional circumstances arising. But 
                                                          
23 Government of Wales Act 2006 Part IV. 
24 Wales Act 2014, s12. 
25 European Union Act 2011, s.4. 
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such an attempt to set out definitively when a referendum must be used can be fraught with 
difficulties. First, it is no easy matter to set out the issues about which a referendum must be 
held. For example, if Parliament were to say any change to the devolution settlements needs a 
referendum this could include minor and incremental changes when there is no appetite 
among the broader public to vote directly on what appears an insignificant or technical 
matter. Such over-regulation can also result in perverse incentives. One danger is that the 
government of the day would seek either to create the conditions for a referendum or to avoid 
these arising, depending on the political benefits or costs it associates with a referendum. 
Another risk is the avoidance of important decision-making because of the threat of a 
referendum on the issue. Also, how would such a general provision be structured? Would it 
be conclusive as to the use of referendums – in effect barring the use of direct democracy in 
other contexts, even those unforeseen at the time of enactment? Or would it leave open 
discretion for referendums in other circumstances. If the latter, it is hard to see what the point 
of such a statute would be; if the former, it is hard to see how such an endeavour would be 
meaningful in light of Parliament’s legislative sovereignty.  
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the symbolic significance of such legislation should not be 
dismissed out of hand. It would serve to indicate that without a subsequent statute repealing 
the referendum provision Parliament would not be able to change fundamental parts of the 
constitution without the direct voice of the people being listened to, and it would also give 
citizens advance notice of when a referendum is likely to be held and on what issues. This in 
turn would seem to boost the opportunities for citizen participation and deliberation in the 
area of constitutional change, and make decisions to hold such referendums decisions of 
principle not political opportunism.  
However, another objection is that such a general law could juridify unnecessarily what is a 
very political issue. There would be the potential of legal disputes concerning whether such 
circumstances have in fact arisen. This can be a difficult and controversial area for judges, as 
we have seen in Ireland where the Supreme Court has had to adjudicate on whether the 
conditions are in place for a referendum.26 A provision intended to facilitate popular 
participation could find itself the subject of even more abstract elite control in a dance 
between government and courts, which may draw the latter into an unnecessary level of 
political contention. 
In my view the current trajectory is probably the correct one for the particular circumstances 
of our unwritten and informal system of parliamentary government. Certain issues find 
themselves subject to referendum lock and other issues, such as independent statehood for a 
part of the UK, in practice now also require a referendum. The gradual development of a 
more semi-formalised approach to the initiation trigger is reducing elite control across a 
number of issues, but also avoids the perils of excessive prescription and the risk that many 
relatively trivial matters would find themselves the subject or a referendum or the subject of a 
lengthy court dispute. In the end there is much to be said for the current British situation 
                                                          
26 Although the Irish constitution provides for the use of a referendum for constitutional amendments 
(Constitution of Ireland, art 46), it was for a time not altogether clear that the ratification of every new European 
Community treaty constituted a constitutional amendment until an important case in 1986 when the Supreme 
Court ruled that further transfers of constitutional powers to the EEC amounting to changes to the ‘essential 
scope or objectives’ of the EEC would require constitutional amendment and a consequent referendum. 
Raymond Crotty v. An Taoiseach and Others [1987] IESC 4. See also Gavin Barrett, ‘Building a Swiss Chalet in 
an Irish Legal Landscape? Referendums on European Union Treaties in Ireland and the Impact of Supreme 
Court Jurisprudence’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 32. 
10 
 
where the use of referendum is for the government to justify both in election manifestos and 
to Parliament, providing the latter does its job and properly scrutinises not only the process of 
the referendum but also the underlying justification for taking a particular issue directly to the 
people and the way in which this is done. 
In any case it is important to note that the initiation power is only the first step in a 
referendum, and the potential for elite control remains a significant issue throughout the 
entire process.  
ii. Question-setting: the intelligibility test 
A second issue implicit within the elite control syndrome, but also crucial to meaningful 
citizen deliberation, is question-setting. Does the executive have untrammelled discretion to 
set a question of its choice? If so, citizens can be presented with a question which is tortuous, 
leading, and difficult to understand. The importance of a clear question has been recognised 
by the Venice Commission in its Code of Good Practice which sets out international 
standards for referendums. This provides that:  
‘the question submitted to the electorate must be clear (not obscure or ambiguous); it 
must not be misleading; it must not suggest an answer; electors must be informed of 
the consequences of the referendum, in particular of the outcome of Yes or No 
majorities in response to each question; voters must answer the questions asked by 
Yes, No or a blank vote.’27 
A primary lesson to be drawn from the Scottish referendum is that the robust nature of 
regulation involved in the process was instrumental in helping to ensure a clear question. 
Fortunately this is an area where the existing UK PPERA regime already has clear strengths, 
and indeed the PPERA model was influential in the process by which the Scottish question 
was arrived at.  
For over a decade UK referendums have operated on the basis of PPERA, which emerged as 
a result of the report by the (Neill) Committee on Standards in Public Life.28 PPERA also 
created the Electoral Commission which was another recommendation of the Neill 
Committee, and in time the Commission’s supervisory and investigatory powers were 
extended by the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009. The Commission has various duties, 
mostly related to funding and spending rules, but PPERA also gives it an important role in 
overseeing question-setting in referendum processes organised by the Westminster 
Parliament. Where a Bill which provides for the holding of a referendum is introduced into 
Parliament, and this Bill specifies the wording of the referendum question, the Commission 
‘shall consider the wording of the referendum question, and shall publish a statement of any 
views of the Commission as to the intelligibility of that question’.29 Notably, the Electoral 
Commission goes about its task of assessing intelligibility by addressing what people really 
                                                          
27 Venice Commission in its Code of Good Practice CDL-INF(2001)010, para. II, E 2.a. See also Venice 
Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice on Referendums’ Study No 371/2006 (19 March 2007) COE Doc CDL-
AD(2007)008rev, para I, 3.1 c, which contains a similar provision. 
28 Neill Report – ‘The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom’ (Fifth Report of the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life, Chairman: Lord Neill of Bladen), London: H.M.S.O., 1998 (Cm. 4057).  
29 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act s.104(2). 
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understand, convening focus groups to test the question empirically, and assessing how well 
it is understood by people etc.30  
PPERA only applies to referendums organised by the Westminster Parliament and so did not 
regulate the proposed referendum in Scotland. The Electoral Commission as a creature of 
PPERA therefore had no automatic role in relation to the Scottish referendum. Despite this, 
the terms of PPERA acted as an important benchmark for the Scottish Government in 
drafting the Scottish Franchise Bill and the Scottish Referendum Bill,31 and for the Scottish 
Parliament deliberating upon these. Furthermore, the Scottish Government decided to send its 
proposed question for review by the Electoral Commission. The Commission acted in line 
with its PPERA role in relation to intelligibility and reported back suggesting a change to the 
question.32 An already clear question was bolstered by the Commission’s recommendation 
that any ‘leading’ element be removed. This was accepted by the Scottish Government and 
this new question was included in the Scottish Referendum Act.33  
This process highlights how regulation in this area not only reins in elite control, it can help 
facilitate citizens in their comprehension of the issue at stake, offering them a question that is 
not only clear but also fair and balanced. In this regard UK law is already well placed to 
regulate question-setting in relation to referendums organised at Westminster. We see another 
instance of this in the role played by the Electoral Commission in the AV referendum in 
2011. Again in this case a change to the question was recommended. The original question 
proposed by the government was: ‘Do you want the United Kingdom to adopt the “alternative 
vote” system instead of the current “first past the post” system for electing Members of 
Parliament to the House of Commons?’. But the Electoral Commission took the view that 
some people, ‘particularly those with lower levels of education or literacy, found the question 
                                                          
30 Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on the UK Parliamentary Voting System: Report of views of the 
Electoral Commission on the proposed referendum question’, (The Electoral Commission, 2010), 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/102696/PVSC-Bill-QA-Report.pdf; 
Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on independence for Scotland: Advice of the Electoral Commission on the 
proposed referendum question’, (The Electoral Commission, 2013) 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/153691/Referendum-on-independence-for-
Scotland-our-advice-on-referendum-question.pdf 
31 The Edinburgh Agreement op. cit. n.6 (para 2) provided: ‘Both governments agree that the principles 
underpinning the existing framework for referendums held under Acts of the UK Parliament – which aim to 
guarantee fairness – should apply to the Scottish independence referendum.  Part 7 of the Political Parties, 
Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA), provides a framework for referendums delivered through Acts 
of Parliament, including rules about campaign finance, referendum regulation, oversight and conduct.’ 
32 The Scottish Government’s proposed question was: ‘Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent 
country? Yes/No’. The Electoral Commission took the view that ‘based on our research and taking into account 
what we heard from people and organisations who submitted their views on the question, we consider that the 
proposed question is not neutral because the phrase ‘Do you agree …?’ could lead people towards voting ‘yes’.’ 
It therefore recommended the following question: ‘Should Scotland be an independent country? Yes/No’.’ 
‘Referendum on independence for Scotland: Advice of the Electoral Commission on the proposed referendum 
question’, (The Electoral Commission, 2013) 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/153691/Referendum-on-independence-for-
Scotland-our-advice-on-referendum-question.pdf. 
33 Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013, s.1(2). See also, ‘Scottish independence: SNP accepts call to 
change referendum question’, BBC News, 30 January 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-
politics-21245701 
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hard work and did not understand it’.34 It went so far as to suggest the question be redrafted 
as follows: ‘At present, the UK uses the “first past the post” system to elect MPs to the House 
of Commons. Should the “alternative vote” system be used instead?’35 And indeed this was 
the question adopted by Parliament in the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies 
Act for use in the referendum.   
Another lesson from this regime, which is applicable particularly in international context, is 
that the body regulating the question must be truly independent and where the state is a multi-
level one, it should enjoy credibility across the state. The legitimacy of the referendum 
question can be a major issue in a sub-state referendum as we have seen in Canada where the 
question set in each of the referendums in Quebec in 1980 and 1995 was heavily contested. 
These questions were written by the Quebec government, were widely considered by the 
opposition to be obscure and possibly misleading, and were not subjected to a level of 
independent oversight that was deemed credible by the federal government. The consequence 
of all of this is an on-going disagreement about how the question-setting process ought to be 
regulated for any future Quebec referendum. Following the 1995 referendum and the 
reference to the Supreme Court brought by the federal government,36 the federal Parliament 
passed a statute seeking to regulate the clarity of the question in any future provincial 
referendum on secession,37 but its authority to do so was in turn contested by Quebec in a 
piece of counter-legislation passed by the National Assembly.38 In contrast with this, the 
credibility of the Electoral Commission across the UK, including the existence of a dedicated 
Electoral Commissioner for Scotland, helped ensure a level of independent oversight that was 
recognised and accepted at both Scottish and UK levels.  
A third point, however, is that arriving at a clear question is only one step in helping to ensure 
a deliberative process that enables the informed participation of citizens. Here we need to link 
the question-setting process back to the initiation power. For example, when we look at the 
AV referendum the Electoral Commission reviewed the question for its intelligibility, but this 
in itself did not put before the people the issue of electoral reform in a way that had been 
subject to full deliberation, laying open the range of possibilities available with which to 
change the UK system. One consequence of a government having the opportunity to use a 
constitutional referendum as a political fix is that the issue to be put to the people may not be 
subjected to thorough and independent scrutiny; instead of a detailed discussion of electoral 
                                                          
34 Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on the UK Parliamentary Voting System: Report of views of the 
Electoral Commission on the proposed referendum question’, (The Electoral Commission 2010), 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/102696/PVSC-Bill-QA-Report.pdf; 
‘Voting referendum question 'too hard', says watchdog’, BBC News website 30 September 2010 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11442445 Accessed 25 February 2013. 
35 Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on the UK Parliamentary Voting System: Report of views of the 
Electoral Commission on the proposed referendum question’, (The Electoral Commission 2010), 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/102696/PVSC-Bill-QA-Report.pdf 
36 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. The Court confirmed that in the event of ‘the clear 
expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada… the other provinces 
and the federal government cannot deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession… so long as 
in doing so, Quebec respects the rights of others.’ (para 92).  
37 Clarity Act 2000: Bill C-20, 2nd sess., 36th Parliament, 48 Elizabeth II, 1999 (as passed by the House of 
Commons 15 March 2000). 
38 An Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Québec people and the 
Québec State, Quebec National Assembly, 1st sess., 36th leg. Bill 99 (assented to 13 December 2000). 
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reform and the opportunity for all of the options to be fully aired, only one model of electoral 
change, which was the result of a compromise between the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat parties and which proved to be difficult to understand and indeed to support, was 
put to the people.39  
One way round this problem would be to introduce a process element, perhaps through an 
amended PPERA, which provides that when an issue is to be put to referendum, an 
independent commission of some kind should be charged with investigating the issue and 
drawing up a question. This could help ensure that the question reflects the type of issues 
upon which most citizens would consider it appropriate to decide. There are different options 
here. One way is to give this power to a small group of citizens, another is to have a non-
partisan committee draw up the issue to be put to a referendum or even the question itself. 
The non-elite, popular model was used in British Columbia in 2004 and Ontario in 2006 
where groups of ordinary citizens were chosen at random and brought together in citizens’ 
assemblies to decide on whether a referendum should be held on electoral reform and if so 
what the question should be. In Australia in 1999 a more elite-level constitutional convention 
was established to prepare for a referendum on the head of state issue. This was partly elected 
and was also composed of many non-party political figures drawn from civil society. Again 
both of these models restrict, or in the latter case disperse, elite discretion. There is no 
guarantee that such models will arrive at the best set of issues to put to the people. Indeed 
both of these examples have been criticised on precisely that basis, but it seems that 
introducing an independent step in the process is more likely than either government 
discretion or inter-party bargaining to arrive at a relevant and legitimate question. 
In the end of course regulation of a question can only do so much. The initiation power may 
be dispersed and the wording of the question may be clear but the issue may well still be very 
complex as issues of independence and electoral reform inevitably are. This is of course 
illustrative of the fact that democracy in practice is not a perfect art. Citizens are inevitably 
presented with a series of complicated issues; in the end, as much in referendums as in 
ordinary elections, they have to make up their own minds on the basis of the evidence 
available and their own time and interest in learning about the issues. 
iii. Good process: facilitating deliberation 
Turning to broader issues of process, what other regulatory steps were taken in designing the 
Scottish independence referendum to facilitate participation and public reasoning? To analyse 
this the referendum needs to be broken down into a series of stages: determining the timing of 
the referendum, the setting of the question, defining the franchise, regulating the campaign 
and ballot procedure, setting funding and spending rules etc., and also providing for 
independent oversight of these different components. I will focus here upon franchise, timing 
and spending rules, each of which is central to either or both of the principles of participation 
and public reason. 
Turning first to franchise, the body of voters in the Scottish referendum was largely 
uncontroversial. The franchise for the referendum was the same as for Scottish Parliament 
elections and local government elections,40 mirroring the franchise used in the Scottish 
                                                          
39 This can be contrasted with the elaborate way in which New Zealand used referendums to test the popularity 
of different electoral models: P. Aimer et al, Toward Consensus?: The 1993 Election and Referendum in New 
Zealand (Auckland University Press, 1995), chapter 10.  
40 Scottish Franchise Act, s.2. 
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devolution referendum in 1997. It was essentially residence-based which meant that even EU 
citizens resident in Scotland were able to vote; in this sense, participation of residents was 
maximised, an important starting point for any republican exercise in popular democracy. 
One major difference from the 1997 franchise, however, was the provision in the Scottish 
Franchise Act extending the vote to those aged 16 and 17.41 This was a radical departure; 
never before have people under the age of 18 been entitled to vote in a major British election 
or referendum.42 And whatever the merits of this decision, it did serve to extend levels of 
participation in the process. 
The referendum was also very well regulated by a dedicated statute addressing franchise and 
seeking to maximise the registration of voters. This statute was highly successful. 
Astonishingly 4,285,323 people (97% of the electorate) registered to vote and in the end 
84.7% turned out, the highest figure for any UK electoral event since the introduction of 
universal suffrage, significantly trumping the 65.1% who voted in the 2010 UK general 
election and the 50.6% who bothered to turn out for the 2011 Scottish parliamentary 
elections. This is even more remarkable when we consider that the franchise was extended to 
younger citizens which created a significant logistical task for those registering new voters 
while take care of data protection and other issues in relation to young people.43 This led to 
the participation of young people who engaged greatly in the referendum process and of 
whom, one ICM survey suggests, 75% voted.44 
Participation in the Scottish referendum contrasts sharply with previous UK referendums, in 
particular with the AV referendum and its turnout of 42.2%.45 But it cannot be said that this is 
a consequence of the energetic registration drive in the Scottish case. People in the UK were 
already registered for the AV referendum in the same numbers as for any general election. 
The issue of participation in the independence referendum hinged instead on two clear issues: 
the subject matter of the vote and timing. The level of debate and subsequent turnout 
demonstrate that the Scottish referendum raised an issue with which people really engaged. 
Turnout is of course only one marker of participation. The story we have heard time and 
again from voters and campaigners alike is that citizens felt greatly empowered by the 
referendum and the role they had in making such a huge decision. Evidence is emerging of 
the extent to which people sought out information about the issue at stake and engaged 
vociferously with one another at home, in the workplace and public spaces and, to an 
unprecedented degree in British politics, on social media through online newspaper comment 
sections, Twitter, Facebook, blogs etc.46  
                                                          
41  Scottish Franchise Act, s.2(1)(a). 
42 Representation of the People Act 1983, s.1(d). 
43 Scottish Franchise Act, s.9. 
44 http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2014/12/many-16-17-year-olds-voted/ 
45 The referendum in Wales in 2011, with a turnout 35.4%, also failed to mobilise public interest.  
46 See Ailsa Henderson et al ‘Risk and Attitudes to Constitutional Change’, ESRC Scottish Centre on 
Constitutional Change Risk and Constitutional Attitudes Survey,  16 August 2014: 
http://www.futureukandscotland.ac.uk/sites/default/files/news/Risk%20and%20Constitutional%20Attitudes%20
Full%20Survey%2014%20Aug.pdf and AQMen project https://www.aqmen.ac.uk/project/socialmedia. 
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The lesson here is simply that the salience of the issue provoked high citizen participation. 
This may be another argument against a general referendum law which prescribes 
referendums for a wide range of constitutional changes. It is perhaps best that referendums be 
preserved for those issues upon which citizens are most likely to engage, a decision which is 
best assessed by Parliament on a case by case basis.  
The other issue relevant to public engagement was timing. One of the standard criticisms of 
referendums from the perspective of deliberation is that they are held too hastily without time 
for proper deliberation of the issues. This was a criticism levelled at the AV referendum. The 
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 received Royal Assent on 16 
February 2011 and the referendum was held on 5 May 2011. This did not allow much time 
for public education on such a complex issue. Clearly this was not a problem in the Scottish 
context where the referendum was proposed some 33 months before it was held and where 
both campaigns had almost two years from the conclusion of the Edinburgh Agreement to 
explain their respective cases to the voters.  
The regulation of timing helps to delimit elite control. The Scottish Government had 
considerable discretion as to the date of the referendum, but this was also regulated by the 
Edinburgh Agreement which provided that a single-question referendum had to be held 
before the end of 2014. Subsequent legislation which fixed the date also gave certainty to 
both campaigns and to citizens as to when the referendum would take place. In other 
situations elites have changed the date. This happened in Quebec in 1995 where the 
referendum date was moved from June to October to offer the nationalists a better chance of 
victory. Once the Scottish date was fixed in law it would have been politically unacceptable 
for the Scottish Government to seek to change it. 
Again what lessons can be drawn for the UK? The length of the process facilitated 
deliberation by giving people time to learn about, reflect upon and deliberate with others over 
the issues at stake. It is of course unrealistic for such a lengthy period to be given ahead of 
every referendum, but for complex issues citizens do need time to learn about the 
consequences of their vote, in a way that was difficult in the short AV referendum campaign.  
Funding and spending is also a central part of any electoral event. One of the main criticisms 
of referendums, particularly in the American context, is that they can be the subject of widely 
distorted campaign expenditure, with voters subjected to heavily disproportionate advertising 
from one side in the campaign.47 This serves to unbalance the environment within which 
citizens are expected to deliberate. Particular risks occur in the period immediately prior to a 
referendum when campaigning becomes more intense, with the concomitant risk of 
misinformation being fed to the public to an extent which makes meaningful citizen 
deliberation very difficult if not impossible. It seems clear, therefore, that the deliberative 
potential of a referendum rests largely upon the existence of a level playing field in relation to 
campaign expenditure. In particular, efforts should be made to ensure that voters do not suffer 
from the distortions of vested interests, including big business, in their attempts to make 
sense of the issue they face. 
The law governing referendums organised by Westminster already provides a detailed regime 
which seeks to meet these goals, and in forming the backdrop to the Scottish referendum it 
was a regulatory model which did indeed help create the conditions for the free flow of 
                                                          
47 D. Broder, Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of Money (Harcourt, 2000). 
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information to and among citizens with influence by each campaign operating in a fairly even 
way. The United Kingdom legal regime, through PPERA, designates a ‘campaign period’ 
within which strict spending rules apply.48 This is a serious attempt to reregulate funding and 
spending with a view to fairness between the campaigns, while allowing for these rules to be 
tailored further from referendum to referendum. It contains a highly elaborate set of financial 
provisions, and in fact the degree of elaboration has come in for some criticism.49 The fact 
that the Electoral Commission oversees the setting and implementation of these spending and 
funding limits, as well as other aspects of the process, also goes a long way to satisfying 
crucial conditions for effective deliberation.50 
Building upon the UK regime, the Scottish Referendum Act sought to ensure equality of arms 
between the two campaign groups. In giving effect to this aim it also modified the PPERA 
regime in a way that may well be instructive for future UK referendums. Each side in the 
campaign was able to apply to the Electoral Commission to be appointed as one of two 
‘Designated Organisations’ – a status which can entail some benefits in terms of the provision 
of public facilities to hold meetings etc. - and both the Yes Scotland and Better Together 
campaign groups intimated their respective intention to do so. They were designated as such 
in April 2014.51 Notably the Act sought to deal with a criticism of PPERA relating to 
designation. PPERA does not permit the Electoral Commission to designate only one 
campaign organisation; either both (or more) must apply for designation or neither can.52 In 
the referendum in Wales in 2011 the No campaign ‘True Wales’ did not apply, which led to a 
criticism that this was ‘gaming’, to prevent the Yes campaign from attracting public funding 
and the other benefits of designation.53 By contrast, the Scottish Referendum Act allowed for 
designation by one side alone,54 thereby avoiding this problem. In the end this was not an 
issue in practice as the two campaigns applied for official status, but it does illustrate that the 
Scottish Parliament addressed PPERA in detail and was keen to adopt its advantages and 
tinker with its potential disadvantages. In light of the Welsh experience, there may well be a 
case to amend PPERA ahead of any future UK-wide referendums. 
                                                          
48 PPERA s.102. 
49 N.S. Ghaleigh, ‘Sledgehammers and Nuts?: Regulating referendums in the UK’ in K. Gilland Lutz and S. Hug 
(eds), Financing Referendum Campaigns (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
50 See the final Electoral Commission report on the Scottish referendum process: Electoral Commission, 
‘Scottish Independence Referendum Report on the referendum held on 18 September 2014’, December 2014 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-
and-referendums/referendums/scottish-referendum 
51 ‘Electoral Commission designates ‘Yes Scotland’ and ‘Better Together’ as lead campaigners at Scottish 
Independence Referendum’, Electoral Commission news release 23 April 2014 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/i-am-a/journalist/electoral-commission-media-centre/news-
releases-referendums/electoral-commission-designates-yes-scotland-and-better-together-as-lead-
campaigners-at-scottish-independence-referendum? 
52 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 s.108. 
53 Richard Wyn Jones’ evidence before the Referendum (Scotland) Bill Committee, 9 May 2013. See also S. 
Tierney and S. Suteu, ‘Towards a Democratic and Deliberative Referendum?: Analysing the Scottish 
Independence Referendum Bill and the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Bill’, ESRC Report, 21 
August 2013. 
54 Scottish Independence Referendum Act, sched.4, para 5(3). 
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Another difference from the PPERA model is that the Scottish Referendum Act did not 
provide for any public funding for designated organisations. This again was a conscious 
departure from PPERA which does offer grants to designated organisations.55 The decision 
not to fund the 2014 referendum was a political one taken by the Scottish Government. It did 
not lead to any opposition within the Scottish Parliament, nor by either of the two main 
campaign groups, perhaps because both campaigns expected to be amply funded by private 
donors. Again the UK Parliament is probably wise to assess this case by case in future. If one 
campaign is very under-funded then there may well still be an argument for public funding so 
that both sides of the issue can be presented to the public. 
Turning to the rules in detail, a ‘Campaign Rules’ provision within the Scottish Referendum 
Act created a regulatory regime through which funding, spending and reporting were 
administered.56 This is generally in line with standard PPERA rules. A ‘Control of 
Donations’ provision57 indicates what types of donations were allowed and what constituted a 
‘permissible donor’.58 Under these provisions an application must be made for this status. 
There were also reporting requirements which meant that reports on donations received 
required to be prepared every four weeks during the referendum period (Schedule 4, para 41).  
It is instructive to explain how the spending rules operated in achieving a level playing 
Within the Scottish Referendum Act there were four categories of actor entitled to spend 
money during the campaign period: Designated Organisations (which could each spend up to 
£1,500,000) (Schedule 4, para 18(1)); political parties as ‘permitted participants’  (Schedule 
4, para 18(1)); other ‘permitted participants’ who could spend up to £150,000 (Schedule 4, 
para 18(1)); and any other participants spending less than £10,000, which means they did not 
require to register as permitted participants.  
The Scottish Referendum Act also defined ‘campaign expenses’. These included campaign 
broadcasts, advertising, material addressed to voters, market research or canvassing, press 
conferences or media relations, transport, rallies, public meetings or other events. Again this 
is all in line with PPERA as were the detailed rules on reporting of expenditure (Referendum 
Act, Schedule 4, paras. 20-24).  
These rules in practice led to a fairly even distribution of expenditure between the two 
campaigns. For example, the total spending limit for the two pro-independence parties (SNP 
and Greens) was almost equal to that for the three unionist parties – Labour, Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat. It should also be observed that these rules reflect the spending limits 
recommended by the Electoral Commission59 by which they were overseen, and which issued 
                                                          
55 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 s.110. 
56 Scottish Referendum Act, section 10 and Schedule 4. 
57 Schedule 4, Part 5. 
58 Schedule 4, para 1(2). 
59 ‘Electoral Commission advice on spending limits for the referendum on independence for Scotland’, Electoral 
Commission, 2014 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/153697/Report-on-
spending-limits-for-the-referendum-on-independence-for-Scotland.pdf 
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statements on the four weekly reports.60 The Electoral Commission showed itself prepared to 
intervene to ensure that the registration and spending rules were fully complied with.61  
The Scottish referendum did achieve equality of arms. In future UK referendums, however, 
this would vary from referendum to referendum given the ability of parties to spend money 
based in proportion to its success at the preceding General Election. If more than one main 
party supports or opposes a particular proposition then spending is likely to be heavily 
imbalanced. This could be perceived as a problem, but there is a justification for this based 
upon the popular support expressed for those parties at the previous election which provides 
the parties in question with a particular legitimacy as campaign voices. 
In the end the Scottish referendum demonstrates the effectiveness of the PPERA regime, and 
its flexibility and adaptability to different conditions. The existence of a detailed statute 
which provides general rules on various aspects of the referendum process and its regulation 
and oversight, which can then be supplemented with a specific piece of legislation for the 
referendum in question, allowing for modification of the spending and related rules to suit the 
situation in question, offers a rigorous but in some ways highly adaptable regime. Once again 
the Scottish referendum also showed that the Electoral Commission’s role is crucial, both in 
advising on modifications to PPERA and in overseeing the rules put in place. 
IV. Conclusion 
Referendum democracy is not without its challenges. In particular, the history of the 
referendum does highlight many situations where elite control combined with a lack of 
citizen engagement has served to make direct democracy an easily manipulable device by a 
government seeking to bypass the legislature to achieve its policy preferences.  
I have argued however that these objections are problems of practice not principle. What is 
crucial is adequate regulation both to control the discretion of elites, in particular the 
government of the day, and to facilitate the full and free engagement of citizens. This can be 
done by legal controls in areas such as independent oversight of question-setting, guidelines 
on referendum timing and campaign length, franchise rules, and laws regulating funding and 
expenditure. 
The Scottish referendum is different from standard UK referendums in that the two 
governments each had an element of control over the process. At the level of UK 
referendums organised by Whitehall this level of dispersed control does not apply, which puts 
a particular responsibility on Parliament to ensure that referendums are held only for 
principled reasons and that the process rules are adequate to allow for citizen engagement. To 
this end the PPERA regime was tested in the Scottish campaign, and came through 
successfully. And as I have sought to show, there are lessons from this in terms of question-
setting, independent oversight and spending rules which should inform how PPERA is 
                                                          
60 ‘First pre-poll donations and loans report at Scottish Independence Referendum published’, Electoral 
Commission news release, 8 July 2014; ‘Second pre-poll donations and loans report at Scottish Independence 
Referendum published’, Electoral Commission news release, 5 August 2014.  
61 ‘Electoral Commission voids CBI listing as no campaigner in Scotland vote’, The Guardian, 1 May 2014; 
‘Electoral Commission statement on the CBI Scotland’s annual dinner’, Electoral Commission, 27 August 2014 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/i-am-a/journalist/electoral-commission-media-centre/news-releases-
referendums/electoral-commission-statement-on-the-cbi-scotlands-annual-dinner. 
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applied to future referendum events and how it might be amended, in particular to introduce 
some measure of independence to the issue-framing and question-setting processes. 
In the end of course, there is only so much that legal regulation can do to facilitate 
deliberation. Much must ultimately depend upon the quality of debate within civil society and 
the engagement of the private media. Also the British referendum experience shows that a 
crucial issue is whether the issue matters to citizens. So much of the success of the Scottish 
referendum came down to the fact that citizens used the level playing field provided by the 
regulatory structure to really engage with the issue and to turn out to vote in great numbers in 
a way that simply did not occur with either the AV or Welsh referendums of 2011.  
This suggests that it would be ill-advised to pass a referendum statute that seeks to prescribe 
precisely those issues upon which referendums ought to be held. It is for Parliament to assess 
those issues of greatest salience both to the constitution and to voters which are suitable to be 
put to referendum, case by case and in light of prevailing circumstances. We are seeing this 
emerge gradually in the context of devolution to Wales and Northern Ireland, and also in 
relation to constitutional changes at the European Union level. What seems certain is that the 
referendum as a feature of UK constitutional change is here to stay. On that basis the lessons 
of the Scottish referendum should be taken very seriously as Britain confronts a future in 
which the people will have a significantly greater say in processes of constitutional change. 
 
